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POINT 1 THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION FOR 14 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT RIPE FOR DETERMINATION BECAUSE: 
1. The Engineer has not conducted any discovery, 14 
nor did he submit any affidavits contraverting the 
allegations in the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint; 
2. There is a factual dispute whether the Engineer 14 
properly performed his statutory duties found in § 73-3-
8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to investigate 
the Change Application and to determine its effect on the 
public welfare; 
3. The granting of the Engineer's motion dismissed 14 
the Second Amended Complaint as to the Engineer, thereby 
violating the Courts1 "open door" policy stated in 
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT 2 THE PLAINTIFFS ARE "AGGRIEVED PERSONS" 19 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF § 73-3-14 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AS AMENDED, BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A DIRECT, 
PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AFFECTED 
BY THE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM DECISION, AND BECAUSE THEIR 
PROPERTIES HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED AND WILL BE 
REPEATEDLY DAMAGED IN THE FUTURE AS A DIRECT AND 
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE ENGINEER IN 
APPROVING THE CHANGE APPLICATION. 
POINT 3 THE PLAINTIFFS ARE WITHIN THE "ZONE OF 33 
INTEREST" TEST DISCUSSED ON PAGES 9-16 OF THE ENGINEER'S 
MEMORANDUM, BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUSTAINED BOTH 
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE, BECAUSE THEY ARE WITHIN THE 
CLASS OF PERSONS THE LEGISLATURE SOUGHT TO PROTECT WHEN 
IT ENACTED § 73-3-14, AND BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN 1987, THE TERM "ZONE OF 
INTEREST" SHOULD BE CONSTRUED "NOT GRUDGINGLY BUT AS 
SERVING A BROADLY REMEDIAL PURPOSE," AND AS GRANTING 
"GENEROUS REVIEW PROVISIONS" TO PERSONS ADVERSELY 
EFFECTED OR AGGRIEVED. 
POINT 4 THE ENGINEER' S DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 5 
CLEARLY OUTLINED IN § 73-3-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMENDED, DO APPLY TO PERMANENT CHANGE APPLICATIONS 
COVERED BY § 73-3-3, BECAUSE § 73-3-3(2) EXPRESSLY MAKES 
THESE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES APPLICABLE TO CHANGE 
APPLICATIONS, AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR 
EXCLUDING THEM. 
CONCLUSION 57 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The statutory authority which confers jurisdiction on this 
Court to hear this appeal is found in §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(v), 78-2-
2(3) (i) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Are the Plaintiffs "aggrieved persons" to the Memorandum 
Decision of the Utah State Engineer as the term "aggrieved persons" 
is used in § 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended? The 
decision of the Utah State Engineer referred to in this issue is 
reproduced in the Addendum, 
2. Do the duties and responsibilities imposed by the Utah 
Legislature upon the Utah State Engineer in § 73-3-8 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, apply to Permanent Change Applications 
which are described, dealt with, and covered by § 73-3-3 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The only constitutional provision whose interpretation the 
Plaintiffs believe is determinative is Article 1, Section 11, Utah 
Constitution. This provision is reproduced in the Addendum. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Those statutory provisions whose interpretation the Plaintiffs 
believe are determinative are Sections 73-3-3, 73-3-8, 73-3-14 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. These provisions are reproduced 
in the Addendum. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a claim by the Plaintiffs against Robert 
L. Morgan in his official capacity as the Utah State Engineer in 
Count 1 of the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, hereafter 
"Complaint" [R. 53]. A claim is also made against the other 
Defendants, to-wit: Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
("D") and Draper Irrigation Company ("Draper") in the remaining 
Counts of the Complaint. 
In Count 1, which is the only Count involved in this Appeal, 
the Plaintiffs appeal to the District Court from the Memorandum 
Decision of the Utah State Engineer. This Decision is dated 
December 26, 1985, and involves Change Application No. 57-3411 
(al3077) . A copy of this Decision is included in the Addendum. 
The Decision describes generally the issues included in the Change 
Application, the Protest filed by the plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham, 
the hearings held by the Engineer and his investigation. 
The Plaintiffs claim the Engineer erred in allowing the other 
Defendants' Change Application to be processed and to be approved, 
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because it enabled the other Defendants to construct diversion 
works to change the manner in which they had theretofore conveyed 
water from the vicinity of Bell Canyon Reservoir to the Defendants1 
water treatment plant in Draper, Utah. These diversion works 
consisting of a screwgate, pipeline and other structures were 
constructed on the hillside to the east of the Plaintiffs1 
property, thereby causing substantial flooding damage to their 
property and also to public property in the vicinity, including 
Dimple Dell Road, a proposed site for a public park to be owned by 
the Salt Lake County Recreation Department, and to quasi public 
irrigation systems. This flooding damage consists of a virtual 
waterfall cascading down the hillside bringing debris, boulders, 
and other objects onto the Plaintiffs1 property, thereby destroying 
fences, gouging said property, and interfering with horse and 
cattle businesses which each of the Plaintiffs had conducted on 
their property for several years prior to the time the damage 
began. None of this damage occurred prior to the time the Engineer 
approved the Change Application. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following the filing of the Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, and after the Plaintiffs submitted certain 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents [R. 252] 
to all defendants, the said Engineer filed a Motion For Summary 
Judgment and a Memorandum in support thereof on September 8, 1987 
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[R. 293, 300]. At this time the Engineer had not conducted any 
discovery of his own nor had the other defendants. Plaintiffs 
filed their Memorandum in opposition to the said motion [R. 474], 
On December 4, 1987, the trial judge, Raymond S. Uno, granted the 
Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment, in a Memorandum Decision 
[R. 519]. Thereafter a proposed judgment was prepared by the 
Engineer's counsel and served upon the other parties [R. 523]. 
The Defendant Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
entered an objection to the Engineer's proposed judgment requesting 
that it be identified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP") [R. 538]. The Engineer 
filed his response to the Conservancy District's objections, 
stating that Judge Uno's Memorandum Decision did not contemplate 
a Rule 54(b) Final Judgment [R. 541]. 
Thereafter, a hearing was held on January 22, 1988, at which 
time counsel for the Plaintiffs was given permission to file legal 
authorities dealing with the effect of a Rule 54(b) Judgment on the 
proceedings in the District Court. These legal authorities were 
cited and discussed in a letter dated February 9, 1988, from 
Plaintiffs' counsel to Judge Uno, with copies to the other parties 
[R. 566]. There were no responsive letters from any other counsel 
in opposition to the cases and authorities cited and discussed in 
the said letter found at R. 566. 
On March 14, 1988, the trial judge signed the "Judgment and 
Order Expressly Directing Entry of Judgment Pursuant To Rule 54(b)11 
[R. 599]. The Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 11, 
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1988. [R. 609] 
There were no evidentiary hearings held by the trial judge in 
the District Court, therefore no court reporter's transcript has 
been filed in this Court. The Engineer's Motion For Summary 
Judgment was decided strictly on legal grounds as cited and 
discussed in the Engineer's Memorandum [R. 300] and in the 
Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in opposition to the said motion for summary 
judgment [R. 474]. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs seek to reverse the decision of the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, trial judge, on the grounds his "Judgment and Order 
Expressly Directing Entry of Judgment Pursuant To Rule 54(b)" 
constitutes manifest error. The Plaintiffs seek to have Count 1 
of the Second Amended Complaint reinstated, so the Plaintiffs can 
pursue their cause of action in the said Count 1 against the 
Defendant Robert L. Morgan, Utah State Engineer. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his "Memorandum In Support of Defendant Utah State 
Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment," [R. 300] the Engineer on 
page 2 characterizes the substance of his Motion as follows: 
This motion is directed only to Count I of the 
Second Amended Complaint, which seeks a de novo appeal 
from the Decision of the State Engineer approving the 
application of Defendants Draper Irrigation Company and 
Salt Lake Water Conservancy District to change the point 
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of diversion, place and nature of use of certain water 
rights. This motion is not directed toward any of the 
claims for relief set forth in the balance of the 
Complaint; but since Count I is the only Count involving 
Defendant Utah State Engineer, the granting of this 
motion would dismiss the appeal of the State Engineer's 
Decision approving the change. It will leave the balance 
of Plaintiffs1 claims intact, to be addressed on their 
own merits, and Plaintiffs will have their day in court 
on those claims. 
Count 1 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") 
seeks to review the Memorandum Decision of the Engineer dated 
December 26, 1985, which approved Change Application No. 57-3411 
(al3077) filed by the other Defendants Salt Lake County Water 
Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company [R. 53]. A copy 
of the said Memorandum Decision is attached as Exhibit 1 to the 
said Complaint and is also included in the Addendum hereto. 
The Change Application was filed pursuant to § 73-3-3 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and sought to change the point of 
diversion, place and nature of use of certain water rights in Bell 
Canyon, the Middle and South Forks of Dry Creek, Rocky Mouth, and 
Big Willow Creeks. Notice of the Change Application was published 
in the Deseret News from June 28, 1984, through July 12, 1984. 
Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham filed a timely Protest to the said 
Change Application on the grounds the proposed change would cause 
flooding and other hazardous conditions to his property and would 
also be detrimental to the public welfare. [See Engineer's 
Recitation of Facts in the said Memorandum Decision.] 
On February 26, 1985, a formal hearing was held by the 
Engineer in his offices in Salt Lake City, Utah, to determine the 
merits of the Change Application and also the Protest filed by 
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Bonham. At the hearing, the Plaintiff, his attorney, and private 
engineer were present and presented evidence in the form of aerial 
photographs, color photographs, and other testimony showing 
substantial flooding to the Plaintiffs1 property during 1983 and 
1984. This testimony and evidence supported Plaintiffs1 contention 
that the Change Application and the structures and improvements to 
be installed by the Defendants as a part of the Application would 
cause repeated flooding of the Plaintiffs' properties, would 
unreasonably effect public recreation, would prove detrimental to 
the public welfare, and in fact had already substantially destroyed 
portions of the Plaintiffs1 property [See allegations in Count 1 
of the Complaint at R. 53]. 
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege [and the Plaintiffs 
submit these allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose 
of the Motion For Summary Judgment, since there are no 
contraverting affidavits or other pleadings filed by the Engineer 
to refute any of the allegations in the said Complaint] , the 
Engineer failed to review the plans and specifications dealing with 
the improvements to be constructed by the Defendants Draper and 
District as a part of the Change Application. The Engineer further 
failed to conduct the investigation required by § 73-3-8 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, to determine what damage the said 
Change Application would have to either private or public property 
and whether the Change Application would prove detrimental to the 
public welfare. The Plaintiffs further claim the Engineer also 
failed to comply with the provisions of § 73-3-3(2) Utah Code 
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Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the Engineer failed to 
consider the duties of the applicants — Draper and Conservancy-
District — in connection with the Change Application to the same 
degree and with the same emphasis the Engineer would be required 
to consider these same duties, if the other Defendants had filed 
an original water application under § 73-3-2. 
Approximately ten months after this formal hearing, the 
Engineer entered his Memorandum Decision. Although the Engineer 
allowed the Plaintiff Bonham to file a timely and formal protest, 
and even though he held a hearing on the said protest, and 
allegedly investigated the issues involving the protest, the 
Engineer stated in paragraph 1 on page 2 of his Memorandum Decision 
that he was "without authority relative to damages which may have 
been sustained in connection with project construction which 
occurred as a result of his reaction to water right 
applications...". This conclusion was made in flagrant disregard 
of the clear mandate of § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, which imposes a statutory duty upon the Engineer to 
investigate any and all damage to public or private property and 
the impact the Application will have upon the public welfare. 
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege they had lived 
peaceably on their properties in Sandy, Utah, for approximately 20 
years without being flooded by water in the ditches owned by the 
other Defendants, Draper Irrigation Company and Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District. The Plaintiffs1 properties consist 
generally of ten or more acres of ground which are described in 
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Exhibits 1 and 2 attached to the Complaint [R. 53]. The Plaintiffs 
each had a cattle and horse business operating on their properties. 
The Plaintiffs allege that for approximately 100 years since the 
time the Defendant Draper Irrigation Company first began to 
construct open ditches, flumes, pipelines, and other structures to 
carry water from the vicinity of Bell Canyon Reservoir to Draper's 
Water Treatment Plant in Draper, Utah, the water had been carried 
with no adverse consequences to the Plaintiffs1 property. During 
the 2 0 years or so the Plaintiffs owned and occupied their 
properties, there was no more than a trickle of water that ever 
drained down the hillside to the east of their properties, and none 
of this water ever caused any annoyance, nuisance or damage to 
person or property. 
However, commencing in the spring of 1983, as a sole, direct 
and proximate cause of the negligence of the Defendant Engineer in 
granting preliminary approval to the Change Application described 
above, the said Engineer permitted an inherently dangerous 
condition to exist on the hillside immediately to the east of the 
Plaintiffs' properties. This inherently dangerous condition 
allowed the other Defendants to convey substantial waters from one 
natural watershed to another and to do so without any authority or 
permit from the Salt Lake County Flood Control and Public Works 
Department. The Engineer authorized the construction of a 
screwgate, pipeline and diversion works which had not formerly 
existed. These changes allowed the water which had been routinely, 
for the past 100 years or so, conveyed without incident from the 
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Bell Canyon reservoir area to the Water Treatment Plant in Draper, 
Utah, to now be diverted down the hillside, immediately to the east 
of Plaintiffs1 properties, causing a virtual waterfall to cascade 
down the hill, causing tremendous damage to the Plaintiffs' 
property and the public property in the area. The Plaintiffs' 
properties were gutted, fences were destroyed, deep ravines and 
crevices were carved out, large boulders and other debris as well 
as silt were deposited on the properties. In addition, public 
roads and properties belonging to the Salt Lake County Parks 
Department were destroyed, along with irrigation ditches belonging 
to other ditch companies. [See allegations in Counts 1-3 of the 
Complaint at R. 53]. 
All this damage was done without notice to the Plaintiffs, 
without their approval, and without obtaining any consent 
whatsoever. Damage occurred in 1983, against in 1984, and will 
occur every year in the future when the Defendants close their 
screwgate, allowing waters from the Middle Fork and South Fork of 
Dry Creek to be diverted down the hillside upon Plaintiffs' 
properties; rather than to be conveyed in a pipeline or an open 
ditch to the Defendants' Water Treatment Plaint in Draper, Utah, 
as had been done for decades prior to 1983. 
All of the foregoing "Factual Allegations" are set forth in 
detail in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint [R. 53]. Again, 
since there have been no affidavits contraverting any of the 
allegations in the said Complaint, this Court must accept those 
allegations as true for the purpose of motions for summary 
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judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiffs submit the Defendant Utah State Engineer is 
jointly and severally liable with the other Defendants in this 
action for the inherently dangerous condition which the Engineer 
authorized on the hillside to the east of the Plaintiffs1 
properties. The Engineer was an active participant and expressly 
approved the offending diversion works and screwgate which allows 
severe flooding damage to occur to private and public properties 
each time the screwgate is closed by the Defendants. 
None of the cases cited by the Engineer in his Memorandum in 
Support of his Motion For summary Judgment [R. 3 00] deal with the 
issues raised in this instant lawsuit and not one of the cases 
discusses the definition of "aggrieved parties" in § 73-3-14 UCA, 
1953, as amended, or whether the duties and responsibilities 
imposed upon the State Engineer by § 73-3-8 apply to Change 
Applications. 
The Plaintiffs submit the core issue before this Court is 
whether the Utah State Engineer has complied with the requirements 
in §§ 73-3-3(2) and 73-3-8 to conduct an adequate investigation to 
determine whether the Change Application will prove detrimental to 
the public welfare, will unreasonably affect public recreation or 
the natural stream environment. The Engineer argues he has no duty 
to make the required investigation, the Plaintiffs contend he does. 
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The Engineer admits he has these duties of investigation in 
connection with an original water application filed pursuant to § 
73-3-2, but he is merely a "bump on a log" and can close his eyes 
to any damage to private or public property when he is considering 
Permanent Change Applications under § 73-3-3. [See R. 309 note 1 
in the Engineer's Memorandum where he admits "Interests other than 
impairment of water rights are considered by the State Engineer in 
passing an applications to appropriate water under § 73-3-8, 
but...such criteria do not apply to Change Applications." No 
citations are given to support this proposition, and no cases have 
ever been cited by the Engineer which hold permanent Change 
Applications do not need to be investigated to the same extent as 
original water applications. The instant cases are of first 
impression on this issue!] 
With respect to "aggrieved parties," the Engineer cites lower 
federal court cases dealing with the "Zone of Interest" test, a 
test not found in any Utah statutes or Utah Supreme Court cases 
containing the state's water laws found in Title 73 of the Water 
Code. Furthermore, the Engineer has omitted to state to this Court 
that these lower federal court decisions discussing "Zone of 
Interest" have been modified by a 1987 United States Supreme Court 
decision which interpreted § 10 of the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) , 5 U.S.C. § 702 [5 U.S.C.S. § 702], which 
"grants standing to a person aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute." The court interpreted this § 10 
to grant "generous review procedures" to aggrieved persons and 
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further refused to follow the "narrow construction" placed upon § 
10 by earlier federal cases and by the Comptroller of the Currency. 
Clarke v. Securities Industries Association, 479 U.S. , 107 
S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). 
The United States Supreme Court held the term "aggrieved 
person" in § 10 of the APA should be construed "not grudgingly but 
as serving a broadly remedial purpose." This case will be 
discussed in more detail below. This "narrow construction" of the 
term "aggrieved persons" adopted by the lower federal courts, is 
the same one adopted by the Utah State Engineer in his Memorandum 
[R. 300]. Counsel for the Engineer knew about this case because 
it was discussed orally at the hearing on August 6, 1987, yet 
counsel failed to bring this case to the attention of the Trial 
Court in his Memorandum. The only apparent reason for counsel's 
failure to cite this latest pronouncement on "Zone of Interest" by 
the highest court in the country is no doubt because counsel was 
aware the case argues against the position taken by the Engineer. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs submit the Motion for Summary Judgment 
is far too premature at this early stage in the case to be 
considered. The Engineer has not undertaken any discovery, nor has 
the Engineer responded to the Discovery Documents submitted by the 
Plaintiffs [R. 252-254]. Plaintiffs submit that only after 
adequate discovery has been completed, can this case be in a 
position to entertain Motions for Summary Judgment, and until that 
time all such motions should be denied. 
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POINT 1 
THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT 
RIPE FOR DETERMINATION BECAUSE: 
1. The Engineer has not conducted any discovery, nor did he 
submit any affidavits contraverting the allegations in the 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint; 
2. There is a factual dispute whether the Engineer properly 
performed his statutory duties found in 5 73-3-8 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, to investigate the Change Application 
and to determine its effect on the public welfare; 
3. The granting of the Engineer's motion dismissed the 
Second Amended Complaint as to the Engineer, thereby violating the 
Courts' "open door" policy stated in Article I, Section 11. of the 
Utah Constitution. 
1. The Engineer has not conducted any discovery, nor did he 
submit any affidavits contraverting the allegations in the 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. At the time the Engineer 
filed his Motion For Summary Judgment [R. 293-295] and his 
Memorandum in support of the said Motion [R. 300-328] , the said 
Engineer had not undertaken any discovery proceedings whatsoever. 
No depositions had been taken, and the Engineer had not submitted 
any interrogatories, requests for production of documents or 
requests for admissions. The only discovery outstanding at that 
time was that undertaken by the Plaintiff in submitting both 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the 
Engineer and to the other two Defendants [R. 252-254]. 
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Nor did the Engineer submit any affidavits contravening any 
of the allegations in the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. 
The only affidavit submitted was that of Kent Jones stating he had 
checked the records in the office of the Engineer and could not 
find any evidence of the Plaintiffs owning any water rights in the 
Defendants' ditch facilities which were the subject of the Change 
Application [R. 291-292]. This affidavit does not impact on any 
of the statements in the Second Amended Complaint and is not 
material to the issues raised in either the Memorandum filed by the 
Engineer in the Trial Court [R. 300] or by the Plaintiffs [R. 474]. 
Under these circumstances, the Plaintiffs submit the 
Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment is not ripe for 
determination at this time. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "URCP", provides summary judgment "shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the Engineer is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Since the Engineer has not undertaken any 
discovery nor filed any affidavits in opposition to the allegations 
in the Second Amended Complaint, these allegations must be taken 
as true. What the Engineer is attempting to do is to stop further 
proceedings against himself and to prevent the Plaintiffs from 
having a trial with respect to the allegations in their Complaint. 
This Court has held on numerous occasions "summary judgment 
should be granted only when it is clear from the undisputed facts 
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that the opposing party cannot prevail. In considering a summary 
judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Conder v. 
Williams, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 1987). This Court has also held that 
under Rule 56, summary judgment shall be rendered only if the 
record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact 
properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from 
the facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the party 
opposing the summary judgment. Webster v. Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170 
(Utah 1983) . See also Utah Farm Production Credit v. Wasatch Bank. 
734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987). 
Applying these general principles to the case at hand, it is 
clear Count 1 of the Second Amended Complaint does state a cause 
of action against the Utah State Engineer for the reasons set forth 
hereafter in Points 2. 3 and 4 of this Brief. In Crafts v. Hansen, 
667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), this Court recognized on page 1081, "It 
is noteworthy that none of the respondents have, so far as we can 
determine, cited a single case wherein the Trial Court upheld an 
order of the State Engineer in a water dispute by summary judgment 
on the basis of opinion, testimony and affidavits. Every case 
discussed by the respondents was decided after a fair trial in 
District Court." Similarly, in the instant case, every case cited 
by the Engineer in his Memorandum in support of his Motion For 
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Summary Judgment [R. 300] involved a full trial in the District 
Court. Not only has there been no trial in the instant case, but 
the Engineer has neglected to file any affidavits contravening the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs invite 
this Court to read the allegations in Count 1 of the said 
Complaint, which Count is primarily directed toward the Engineer. 
Paragraph 9 of the Complaint states at the hearing held in 
the Engineerfs office, the Plaintiffs1 private engineer, Jack L. 
DeMass, presented evidence to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs1 
property and the public welfare had been detrimentally, adversely, 
and negatively affected by the Change Application approved by the 
Engineer. In paragraph 10, the Plaintiffs allege the Engineer, by 
approving the Change Application, allowed the other Defendants to 
change the natural flow of water in certain natural tributaries in 
Salt Lake County, and also to divert water from one watershed to 
another, to change open ditches to underground pipelines, to change 
points of diversion, to build metering stations, overflow 
structures, and to otherwise change the course, channel, and 
conveyance of water from the Bell Canyon Reservoir to the other 
Defendants1 water treatment plant. In paragraph 11 the Plaintiffs 
alleged the action of the Engineer impacts upon natural tributaries 
in Salt Lake County without complying with the flood control 
ordinances in the County, and without complying with other 
provisions of the Utah State statutes and without obtaining the 
requisite permit from the Salt Lake County Department of Storm 
Drainage and Flood Control, from the Salt Lake County Public Works 
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Department, and from other Salt Lake County and State of Utah 
offices and agencies. 
In paragraph 12 of the said Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege 
the Engineer made only a cursory investigation of the complaints 
and protests made by the Plaintiffs, but did not undertake any in-
depth investigation, nor did he conduct his own independent 
engineering inspection and investigation of the property in any 
intelligent way to determine whether the public welfare would be 
adversely and negatively affected by the Change Application. 
Again, all of these allegations in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 
12 and other paragraphs of the said Complaint must be taken as 
true, since the Engineer has not submitted any affidavits 
controverting these allegations. 
2. There is a factual dispute whether the Engineer properly 
performed his statutory duties pursuant to the provisions of 5 73-
3-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. as amended, to investigate the 
Change Application to determine whether it would prove detrimental 
to the public welfare. This issue is more fully discussed in Point 
4 of this Brief, which Point 4 of the argument is by reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. Again, the holdings 
of this Court provide that in a Rule 56 Motion For Summary 
Judgment, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint must be 
taken as true, since they are not controverted by any discovery or 
affidavit from the Engineer. 
3. The granting of the Engineer's Motion violated the "open 
door" access to the courts policy stated in Article 1, Section 11, 
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of the Utah Constitution. The Second Amended Complaint shows 
substantial damage to private and public property which was 
proximately caused by the action of the Engineer in approving the 
Change Application submitted by the other Defendants. In Lewis v. 
Pinqree National Bank, 47 U.35, 151 P.588, this Court held a right 
of action exists for any injury or damage to private property, and 
neither the Legislature nor municipalities can interfere with that 
right. In Utah State University v. Sutro & Co. . 646 P. 2d 715 (Utah 
1982), this Court further held the constitution assures access to 
the courts for the protection of rights and redress of wrongs; 
therefore, summary judgment which denies the opportunity of trial 
should be granted only when it clearly appears there is no 
reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail. In 
the instant case, and as will be pointed out hereafter in this 
Brief, there is much "reasonable probability" the Plaintiffs could 
prevail in the action in the District Court. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs submit the 
Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment is premature and is not ripe 
for determination at this time, and is further violative of the 
provisions of Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution 
providing open access to the courts and opportunity for trial. 
POINT 2 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE "AGGRIEVED PERSONS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
§ 73-3-14 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, BECAUSE THE 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE A DIRECT, PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY AFFECTED BY THE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM DECISION, AND 
BECAUSE THEIR PROPERTIES HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED AND WILL BE 
REPEATEDLY DAMAGED IN THE FUTURE AS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT 
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OF THE CONDUCT OF THE ENGINEER IN APPROVING THE CHANGE APPLICATION. 
In the Engineer's Memorandum in support of his Motion For 
Summary Judgment [R. 300] on pages 6-16 thereof, the Engineer 
discusses the issue of whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" 
under § 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Most of 
this discussion [R. 309-316] deals with the "Zone of Interest" 
argument which is not found anywhere in the Utah Water laws. The 
Engineer argues Utah should follow certain federal court decisions. 
This "Zone of Interest" concept has not been adopted in Utah. 
However, since it has been raised, the Plaintiffs will discuss it 
separately in POINT 3 below. The Plaintiffs will discuss a United 
States Supreme Court case decided in 1987 which disposes of this 
issue of "aggrieved persons" adverse to the Engineer. See 
discussion in Point 3 of Clarke v. Securities Industries 
Association, 479 U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). 
With respect to the three pages, [R. 306-309] in the 
Engineer's Memorandum which attempt to discuss § 73-3-14 without 
the "Zone of Interest" dialogue, the Plaintiffs submit the Engineer 
missed the point completely of what this case is all about 1 All 
the cases cited by the Engineer stand for the proposition that "A 
water user, even with an earlier priority, cannot by Change 
Application increase its historic depletion of water to the 
detriment of other existing water users." See Engineer's 
Memorandum at R. 3 08. The Plaintiffs admit this general principle 
of law. The Plaintiffs also admit the holdings in several of the 
other cases cited by the Engineer which all deal with conflicts 
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between competing water users who both have claimed vested water 
rights. 
However, the Plaintiffs submit there is not one comment in any 
of these cases cited by the Engineer which defines the term 
"aggrieved persons" nor what the Utah legislature intended by 
including these words in § 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated. Nowhere 
in Engineer's Memorandum [R. 300-328] is this issue discussed. 
Without any cases to support the Engineer's interpretation of § 73-
3-14, his interpretation in his Memorandum is the Engineer's own 
private interpretation and is not entitled to any weight whatsoever 
by this court. The Plaintiffs will cite several cases which 
specifically interpret the term "any aggrieved person" in statutes 
identical to §§ 73-3-14 and 73-3-15, and which hold persons 
similarly situated as the Plaintiffs are clearly "aggrieved 
persons". 
Section 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, reads 
in part as follows: "In any case where the decision of the State 
Engineer is involved, any person aggrieved by the decision may 
within sixty days after notice bring a civil action in the District 
Court for a plenary review..." (emphasis added). Again the key 
term is "any person aggrieved" by the decision of the Engineer. 
The fact the legislature chose to use the word "any" two times in 
the first fourteen words of this section indicates a legislative 
intent to make the appeal process as broad as possible. The cases 
cited hereafter also adopt this broad interpretation of the term 
"any person aggrieved." 
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The Utah legislature said "any case" and "any person." The 
Engineer in his Memorandum in the trial court, and presumably in 
his Brief to be filed in this Court, spotlights the term "vested 
water rights" and impairment of such rights. He argues a person 
cannot be aggrieved unless he has some "vested water rights" even 
though his property may be wiped out as effectively as by an 
earthquake by the change application. However, in § 73-3-14, there 
is no attempt to restrict the persons entitled to plenary review 
in the District Court to-only those who have "vested water rights." 
Had the legislature wanted to so restrict the plenary review to 
only those with "vested water rights," the legislature could have 
clearly done so with appropriate language. 
The "Zone of Interest" concept contended for by the Engineer 
in his Memorandum does not require the "persons aggrieved" to 
appear in the administrative proceedings. See POINT 3 below 
discussing the "Zone of Interest" issue. Yet the Engineer argues 
the plaintiffs other than Stanley B. Bonham- have no standing, 
because they did not file a formal "Protes" nor appear at the 
hearing in the Engineer's office. The Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham 
was a formal protestant, did file a protest, did appear at the 
hearing, and his problems allegedly were investigated by the 
Engineer. The fact the other Plaintiffs did not formally appear 
in these administrative proceedings, is not fatal to their cause 
of action, and all the cases construing the term "any aggrieved 
person" hold the definition of the term does not require a person 
to be a party to the state agency proceedings, nor do they need to 
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have even an economic interest in the proceedings, so long as they 
can show a direct, personal interest. Kramer v. Government of the 
Virgin Islands, 453 F.2d 1245 (3rd Cir. 1971), Tanner v. City of 
Boulder, 151 Colo. 283, 377 P.2d 945 (1962), and Clarke, supra. 
The Plaintiffs submit Kramer, supra, is virtually identical 
to the instant case, and disposes of all the arguments made by the 
Engineer with respect to how the language "any person aggrieved" 
in § 73-3-14 should be interpreted. In Kramer, the Plaintiffs were 
owners of property directly overlooking the site of a proposed 
drive-in theater. They appealed from an order of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands dismissing their Complaint on the 
grounds that since they were not parties in the proceedings before 
the Board of Appeals, they had no standing to seek review of the 
Board's decision under the applicable statutes. The statute in the 
Kramer case is virtually identical to its Utah counterpart. That 
statute provided in part as follows: 
Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Board 
may seek review of the same by the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands. Appeal for such review must be made 
within thirty days of receipt of decision by the person 
seeking review. (emphasis added). 
The District Court reasoned that since the time within which 
review may be brought runs from the date the would-be Plaintiff 
receives the Boardfs decision, and since the Board would notify 
only those parties before it, it followed that persons who are not 
parties before the Board cannot come within the class of "any 
persons aggrieved." This argument is exactly like the argument 
made by the Engineer in his Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
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Engineer argues the Plaintiffs other than Stanley B. Bonham were 
not parties to the proceedings in the Engineer's office, and 
therefore were not "aggrieved" by the Engineer's Memorandum 
Decision. The language used in the Virgin Island statute is even 
stronger in support of his conclusion than the language in 73-3-
14. However, Kramer holds against the Engineer and not only 
interprets what the term "any person aggrieved by any decision" 
means, but also stated it is not necessary for a party to appear 
in the administrative proceedings to be an "aggrieved person." 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the U.S. District Court and determined the legislative 
intent by the simple wording of the statute which is identical to 
"S 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Circuit 
Court held the legislature's intent was to allow appeal rights even 
though the persons had not formally appeared in the administrative 
proceeding. Again the key to interpreting the legislative intent 
was the use of the word "any" just as in the Utah water laws. 
[1-3] We cannot agree with the District Court's 
interpretation. The Virgin Islands Legislature chose the 
words 'any person aggrieved by any decisions' (emphasis 
added) to delineate the class of persons granted the 
right of review under this statute. It is a well settled 
rule of statutory construction that the legislature must 
be presumed to use words in their known and ordinary 
significance [citing United States Supreme Court and 
other federal court cases]. Application of this 
principle to the instant case can lead to but one result. 
'Any person aggrieved by any decision' encompasses all 
persons who were aggrieved by any decision of the Board 
of Appeals, not just parties before the Board. The only 
limitation upon the class is that they be aggrieved. The 
30-day period in which an appeal must be taken is not a 
limitation upon the class of persons granted a right of 
appeal but rather an attempt to limit the time in which 
an appeal may be taken. In determining whether or not 
a person is aggrieved, federal courts have held that to 
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be aggrieved an affected party need not have a personal 
economic interest. He needs only to show a direct 
personal interest. See Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, 615 
(C.A.2, 1965), cert, denied, Consolidated Edison Co. of 
N.Y., Inc. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 
U.S. 941, 86 S.Ct. 1462, 16 L.Ed.2d 5040 (1966). In that 
case, the court in interpreting a statute similar to the 
statute involved in the instant case held: 
Those who by their activities and conduct 
have exhibited a special interest in such 
areas, must be held to be included in the 
class of 'aggrieved1 parties * * *.M 3 54 F. 2d 
616. 
Appellants in the instant case meet this criterion. As 
landowners in the area of and overlooking the site of a 
proposed drive-in theater, they have a special and direct 
personal interest in its location. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the instant case, the Plaintiffs have alleged 
in their Second Amended Complaint their personal, economic, and 
direct interest in the Engineer's Memorandum Decision. They 
alleged the Engineer's approval of the Change Application violates 
their rights as owners of property in that the Defendants are 
permitted solely by virtue of the changes allowed in their 
Application to unreasonably discharge virtual waterfalls on the 
Plaintiffs1 properties at the Defendants' sole whim and will, 
whenever the screwgate is lowered in the Defendants' diversion 
structure. 
In Tanner, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court held a statute 
authorizing "any person aggrieved" by any annexation proceeding to 
obtain judicial relief is not limited to those who are entitled to 
protest as landowners in the area to be annexed, but the statute 
includes any person who shows he is in fact aggrieved by the 
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offending ordinance* Similarly, in the instant case, even if none 
of the Plaintiffs had appeared as protestants in the hearing on 
Defendants' joint Change Application, they would still not be 
precluded from filing this action in the District Court as 
"aggrieved persons." However, as everyone admits, the Plaintiff 
Stanley B. Bonham did file a formal protest pursuant to the 
provisions of § 73-3-7, and the Engineer does not challenge his 
standing to file a protest, which that section states must be "duly 
considered by the state engineer." 
The Engineer also treated the Plaintiffs as "aggrieved 
persons" during his administrative proceedings. If the issue of 
"aggrieved persons" is as simple as the Engineer contends in its 
Memorandum it is, then why did the Engineer hold a formal hearing 
on the Bonham protest in February, 1985, make an on-site field 
investigation of the Plaintiffs1 properties and the Defendants1 
improvements in May of 1985, and then wait an additional seven 
months to further investigate this matter before issuing his 
Memorandum Decision on December 26, 1985? If the issue of 
"aggrieved parties" involves only "impairment of vested water 
rights," the Engineer could easily have disposed of this matter in 
a summary fashion, since he knew the Plaintiffs did not own any 
vested water rights. See the affidavit of the Engineer's Employee, 
Kent Jones, verifying the Plaintiffs had no vested water rights. 
[R. 291-292]. 
In his Memorandum, the Engineer acknowledges at the hearing 
in the District Court on August 6, 1987, on the Plaintiffs1 Motion 
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To Strike Certain Defenses, the Court told counsel for the Engineer 
he had some reservations about the issue of "aggrieved parties" and 
also other issues as raised in the Engineer's Memorandum. [See R. 
3 02 of the Engineer's Memorandum which acknowledges this concern 
on the part of the Court at the August 6 hearing.] The Court 
expressed concern over Article 1 Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution which states all courts will be open for a redress of 
any injuries done to the parties, and no person should be deprived 
of their right to come into court. The trial judge also raised the 
question as to why shouldn't the duties of the State Engineer in 
§ 7 3-3-8 apply as much to Change Applications as to Original 
Applications in order to ensure the public welfare was protected 
as required by § 73-3-8. 
The issues involving the Engineer's duties to undertake the 
investigation described in § 73-3-8 are discussed in POINT 4, 
infra. The important aspect of the trial judge's comments with 
respect to this POINT 2, is that he did express reservations about 
the Plaintiffs not being able to pursue their remedies in the 
courts if the interpretation placed on § 73-3-14 by the State 
Engineer was correct. The Plaintiffs submit it was not correct for 
all of the reasons set forth in this POINT 2 and the other POINTS 
in this memorandum, and also for the following reasons: 
The Engineer, throughout his Memorandum, appears to be taking 
the position he is above the law, and Plaintiffs have no right to 
commence legal action against the Engineer, even though the 
Engineer's action triggered the very damage which the Plaintiffs 
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experienced and which could in the future wipe out a large part of 
their real estate. Obviously the Engineer's interpretation shuts 
the Court's doors to any redress by the Plaintiffs. This is 
contrary to the express provisions of Article 1 Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution stating that all courts will be open. The Utah 
Supreme Court has also held the power of the State Engineer is not 
absolute! The Engineer is asking for judicial immunity in this 
case. This Court hit this argument head on and dismissed it as 
being without merit. In American Fork Irrigation Company, et al. 
v. Link, et al. , 239 P.2d 188 (1951), Justice Henroid held in part 
as follows: 
[1] We need not discuss at length defendants' 
contention that the engineer's conclusion as to the 
practicability of administering a proposed change should 
remain invalid and immune from judicial review or 
reversal. Recently this court negatived such 
contentions, announcing that the engineer's findings and 
decisions have a sanctity extending no further than the 
authority delegated by law to his office. Also that such 
findings and decisions, administrative in nature, merit 
studied consideration at great length, nevertheless the 
judiciary is the sole ultimate arbiter of law and fact 
in water cases, bound neither by the nature, extent or 
content of his decision, nor as to the character, quantum 
or guality of proof, evidence or data deduced at hearings 
before him or accumulated independently by his office. 
Our legislature obviously invested him with important but 
not conclusive discretionary powers and duties deserving 
of great respect, but as a safeguard against possible 
injustice, and by plenary review on trial de novo, it 
also invested the court with the ultima ratio and final 
say as to the conflicting contentions of applicant and 
protestant. For example, where the application is for 
appropriation of water, the court may receive and 
consider competent and admissible evidence dehors the 
record, findings, data, or decision developed in the 
Engineer's office relating thereto... [emphasis added]. 
Similar in the instant case, and since the Engineer has not 
conducted any discovery whatsoever nor controverted any of the 
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allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the Engineer and this 
Court must assume these allegations are true and admit Plaintiffs1 
properties will be damaged by the improvements which are 
constructed as a part of the Change Application approved by the 
Engineer. The Engineer must further admit as true all the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint describing the 
extensive damage to Plaintiffs1 properties and their cattle and 
horse business as a sole and proximate result of the Engineer's 
approval of the Change Application. None of the flooding damage 
to the Plaintiffs1 properties occurred prior to the time the Change 
Application was approved. Even though the Engineer admits the 
Change Application and improvements constructed pursuant thereto 
are the direct and proximate cause of the damage to the Plaintiffs1 
properties, the Engineer still argues he is immune from judicial 
review in this action. Obviously such a position is contrary to 
the Utah Constitution and the interpretation of every state and 
federal court which has construed the terms "any aggrieved person." 
Again, since the Engineer has not cited one case defining the 
critical term "any aggrieved person," the Plaintiffs submit the 
holdings of the courts in this Memorandum must control, and the 
Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment should be denied. 
Section 73-3-14 allows judicial "plenary" review in a trial 
de novo. Plenary review is the broadest of all types of appellate 
examination. The word "plenary" means full, entire, complete, 
absolute, perfect, unqualified. Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, et 
aL./ 134 P.2d 976, 979 (Okl. 1942). Plenary review has also been 
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defined as a "full review, a complete review." D&RGWRRR v. PSC, 
98 Utah 431 100 P.2d 552, 555 (1940). 
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has discussed 
the issue of "standing" with respect to Rule 24(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "FRCP". Sanguine, Ltd. v. U.S. 
Department of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1984) and Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978). In Natural Resources, 
the Tenth Circuit dealt with the sufficiency of an interest to 
support standing in judicial review. The Court held the interest 
to sue does not hinge on a direct interest, that construction being 
too narrow. The Court held the parties1 standing can be rejected 
only if it can be shown there is no property interest of any 
character that could be impaired by the outcome. The Court further 
held such an interest did not even have to be a direct interest. 
In this case, the Tenth Circuit recognized a claim that bird 
feathers were ecologically threatened was an insufficient interest 
to maintain an action. 
In Sanguine, supra, the Tenth Circuit further held that where 
nine individuals sought to intervene in an action involving a 
mineral lease, the said individuals had standing to sue under Rule 
24(a)(2) FRCP, since they could show a direct ecomonic benefit in 
a ruling which might be favorable to them. The government resisted 
the intervention on the grounds of untimeliness and also upon the 
failure of the nine intervenors to show an interest "relating to 
the property or transaction which is the subject to the action" 
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under Rule 24. 
It is recognized these two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
cases deal with litigation in the United States District Court 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They do not involve 
an appeal of an administrative agency. The United States Supreme 
Court in Clarke, supra, has greatly enlarged the rights of judicial 
review to those persons who are aggrieved because of the decision 
of a state administrative agency. In this sense, the instant case 
involving the Utah State Engineer is more like the administrative 
procedures cases cited in Clarke, than the Tenth Circuit Court 
cases. However, the Tenth Circuit Court cases are cited simply to 
show that even in direct actions, as opposed to appeals from 
administrative bodies, the courts are willing to consider the 
question of standing and to enlarge the group protected. For 
example, in Sanguine, the Tenth Circuit Court held the nine 
intervenors did have sufficient interest to maintain the 
litigation. The Court stated their interpretation of the 
"interest" requirement was a "practical guide to disposing of 
lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is 
compatible with...due process." 736 F.2d 1420. 
In 1A C.J.S. 444 Actions § 58, the author defines "an 
aggrieved party" as one suffering a direct and actual damage — 
"...the party to sue is one whose right, or a duty to whom, has 
been violated...". 
For the reasons discussed above, the Plaintiffs submit they 
are "aggrieved persons" as that term is used in § 73-3-14 and 15 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The Engineer relies upon the case of Crafts v. Hansen, 667 
P. 2d 168 (Utah 1983) and cites this case several times in his Trial 
Memorandum [R. 300]. The Crafts case did not answer any of the 
issues raised in the instant case. Crafts did not discuss whether 
the Plaintiffs would be "aggrieved parties" under § 73-3-14 under 
the circumstances in this case. In fact, §§ 73-3-14 and 15 were 
not even involved in Crafts. Furthermore, this Court in Crafts did 
not discuss whether the Engineer's statutory duties of 
investigation described in § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, apply to Permanent Change Applications described in § 73-
3-3. Since neither of these critical issues, which are the only 
issues presented for review in the instant case, were discussed in 
Crafts, the Plaintiffs do not understand the Engineer's citation 
to Crafts. Actually, Crafts recognizes prior motions of the Utah 
State Engineer for Summary Judgment have never been decided on the 
basis of affidavits only, but always after a full trial of the 
issues. In our case, the Engineer has not even filed opposing or 
controverting affidavits as was the case in Crafts. With respect 
to this issue, the Court stated on page 1080 of the Pacific 2d 
Reporter as follows: 
It is noteworthy that none of the respondents have, 
so far as we can determine, cited a single case wherein 
the trial court upheld an order of the State Engineer in 
a water dispute by summary judgment on the basis of 
opinion testimony and affidavits. Every case discussed 
by the respondents was decided after a full trial in the 
District Court...The fact that summary disposition of 
such cases appears to have been rare or nonexistent does 
underscore the nature and kind of evidence likely to be 
relied on by the parties therein, and offered by the 
parties here. 
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If the Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, the 
Plaintiffs1 cause of action against the Engineer will be dismissed 
with prejudice. The Plaintiffs submit such a result under the 
circumstances of this case at the time the Motion For Summary 
Judgment was filed, and without any discovery proceedings or 
controverting affidavits filed by the Engineer, violates the 
provisions of Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution which 
provides in part, "All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him and his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay;...". See the Plaintiffs1 
discussion of this constitutional provision in Point 1, supra, and 
paragraph 3 therein. 
Again, the issues presented to this Court in this case are 
ones of first impression, and there are no Utah cases which the 
Engineer has cited which even remotely discuss the issues involved 
under the factual circumstances in this case. 
POINT 3 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE WITHIN THE "ZONE OF INTEREST" TEST 
DISCUSSED ON PAGES 9-16 OF THE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM, BECAUSE THE 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUSTAINED BOTH A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE, BECAUSE 
THEY ARE WITHIN THE CLASS OF PERSONS THE LEGISLATURE SOUGHT TO 
PROTECT WHEN IT ENACTED § 73-3-14, AND BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN 1987, THE TERM "ZONE OF INTEREST" SHOULD 
BE CONSTRUED "NOT GRUDGINGLY BUT AS SERVING A BROADLY REMEDIAL 
PURPOSE," AND AS GRANTING "GENEROUS REVIEW PROVISIONS" TO PERSONS 
ADVERSELY EFFECTED OR AGGRIEVED. 
As discussed in POINT 1, above, the Defendant Engineer has not 
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cited in his Memorandum [R.300] even one case construing the term 
"any person aggrieved11 as used in § 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs have cited in 
POINT 1, above, cases construing the term "any persons aggrieved" 
which hold the Plaintiffs in the instant case would come within the 
definition of this term as interpreted by the various federal and 
state courts. In an attempt to find cases to support his 
conclusion, the Engineer drifts into the "Zone of Interest" concept 
discussed by some of the lower federal courts in construing Section 
10 of the Administrative Procedures Act. 
Unfortunately, the Engineer in his Memorandum in support of 
his Motion For Summary Judgment [R. 300] failed to cite a very 
recent case decided only last year by the United States Supreme 
Court which interprets the term "Zone of Interest" and "aggrieved 
persons" in a manner adverse to the position taken by the Engineer. 
Clarke v. Securities Industries Association, 479 U.S. , 107 
S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d- 757 (1987). The Engineer's counsel knew 
about this case because Plaintiffs1 counsel cited it at the hearing 
in the trial court on August 6, 1987, and the Engineer's counsel 
admitted he was aware of it. Why the Engineer failed to cite this 
case in his Memorandum is a mystery to the Plaintiffs, unless the 
Engineer recognizes the United States Supreme Court has already 
decided this issue adverse to the Engineer's position. 
In Clarke, the United States Comptroller of the Currency 
granted two national banks the right to open affiliated offices 
outside of their own state of incorporation. This was an 
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administrative decision by a federal agency (Comp: . ..* . • ' * 
Currency) , an I the pi::i nciples involved are siitr . u 
administrati /e deci si 01 i < :>f 
nstant case. 
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36(f •• rhf- National Bam A*-* * i\-~ * . * - - :' :mc thus subject 
The t w- national banks raised t~h* same argument the. Engineer 
does ±n r nstant case \" Securities Industries 
Association ii.xl ivd n.c/c ciana" • n n i n C!.ff(«s 
District Couit , "The opinion doc . * ^tate the Association even 
I[»P«'.UMM1 i in IIH in n i H :er;d i nas before the Comptrollrr nf M v Currorr ^  
nor did the Association voice any objection .•. ..,p:: . 
cieclsion prim to the t I mo the J awsuit was ^  filed. However, that 
I in j 1 1 1 1 i •-, mi mi i I in in i in i in in I 11 I in in " i in in > ] 
not be discussed further1. 
In Clarke, the two national banks 'adopted the r^sition 
a 1 J v1 i ' U p p u i I o d ! » , ' I I n i '< mi l i l . r <» I II • ' " • " \ 
trade association "lack;, standing because i > v> ?K;t within urn ,-
OJL interest protected by t h< i McFadden A * ^ N ^ .?.:•"* is 
amende^ . . comptroller coi it ended tongrec, }..r^»*- * *. : 
Act - f * protect securities dealers : .;t t;o establish competit cc 
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equality between state and national banks. This is the same 
argument the Engineer is asking this Court to approve in his 
instant Motion For Summary Judgment, that is, the water law review 
provisions in § 73-3-14 are only to protect persons with vested 
water rights, and, therefore, the Plaintiffs lack standing because 
they did not own any water rights. 
In responding to this argument, the United States District 
Court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the 
United States Supreme Court all held the interpretation placed upon 
§ 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act by the Comptroller of the 
Currency "was too narrow a construction,ft and did not take into 
account the Administrative Procedure Act's "generous review 
provisions" and its "broadly remedial purpose." The Comptroller 
interpreted the statute to require an "aggrieved person" to 
demonstrate either a "legal interest" as that term had been 
narrowly construed in the earlier United States Supreme Court 
cases, or alternatively as requiring an explicit provision in the 
relevant statute permitting suit by any party "adversely effected 
or aggrieved. The Plaintiffs submit the Engineer's arguments in 
the instant case are precisely the same as those contended for by 
the Comptroller of the Currency. 
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act [APA], 5 
U.S.C. § 702 grants "standing to a person aggrieved by agency 
action within the meaning of a relevant statute." [emphasis 
added]. This is similar to the words "any person aggrieved" in § 
73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated. The United States Supreme Court 
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Clarke cited extensively from prior United States Supreme 
1
 '
!
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Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 
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banks and the bank customers. There was no serious question that 
the data processors had sustained an injury in fact by virtue of 
the Comptroller's action. Rather, the question, which the Court 
described as one of standing, was whether the data processors 
should be heard to complain of that injury. Similarly in the 
instant case, the Engineer must admit the Plaintiffs have sustained 
serious and substantial damages, as morely fully set forth in their 
Second Amended Complaint; however, the Engineer has taken the 
position the Plaintiffs should not be heard to complain of that 
injury in an appeal from the Engineer's administrative agency 
decision. 
In Data Processing, the Court said the matter was basically 
"one of interpreting congressional intent," and the Court looked 
to § 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act which "grants standing 
to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute."' The Court of Appeals had interpreted § 702 of 
the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") as requiring either (1) 
the showing of a "legal interest," as that term had been narrowly 
construed in the Supreme Court's earlier cases, or (2) 
alternatively as requiring an explicit provision in the relevant 
statute permitting suit by any party "adversely affected or 
aggrieved." The Supreme Court recognized it was unwilling to take 
so narrow a view of the APA's "generous review provisions," and 
stated that in accordance with previous decisions, the Act should 
be construed "not grudgingly but as serving a broadly remedial 
purpose." The Court then stated, "Accordingly, the data processors 
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broaden the class of protected persons at least f„ u:e same extent 
Clarke, * ;> ourt n*;:.*-* , - "--l recent] y reaffirmed the 
liberal leading of rh^ review provisions of the Federal 
• '• .•*:-!. . u . • in a recent case — Japan Whaling 
Association v. American Cetecean Society, 4 78 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 2 8 60, 
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92 L.Ed 2d 166 (1986). In Japan Whaling, the Cetecean Society 
sought judicial review of the Secretary of Commerce's refusal to 
carry out his alleged duty under the Pelly Amendment of the 
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967 to certify Japan for taking 
actions that diminished the effectiveness of the International -
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. The Secretary contended, 
among other things, that the Cetecean Society had no private cause 
of action under the Pelly Amendment. 
The Court rejected this argument and expressly held the 
Respondents did have a right of action "expressly created by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that ' final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] 
subject to judicial review,' § 704, at the behest of '[a] 
person...adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action." The 
words "a person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action," 
are virtually identical to the language found in § 73-3-14 which 
allows judicial review to "any person aggrieved by any 
decision...". Obviously, again, in 1986, the United States Supreme 
Court wanted to enlarge or broaden the definition of "aggrieved" 
persons who were protected and who had a right of appeal from 
Federal Administrative Procedures Act agency decisions. This is 
exactly the case we have in the instant action wherein an official 
Utah State agency decision is involved. 
In Japan Whaling, the Supreme Court cited from an earlier 
decision and went even further in making a stronger case for 
enlarging the class of protected persons. The Court cited Block 
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aggrieved," i.e., injured in fact, the additional requirement that 
"the interest sought to be protected by the Complainant [be] 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated 
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 
The Court recognized the "Zone of Interest" formula in Data 
Processing has not proved self-explanatory, "but significant 
guidance can nonetheless be drawn from that opinion. First. The 
Court interpreted the phrase fa relevant statute1 in § 702 
broadly...Second. The Court approved the "trend...toward [the] 
enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative 
action...The Court struck the balance in a manner favoring review, 
but excluding those would-be plaintiffs not even 'arguably within 
the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the 
statute...'" [emphasis added] 
The Court continued discussing the zone-of-interest test in 
part as follows: 
[3b] The zone of interest test is a guide for 
deciding whether, in view of Congress1 evident intent to 
make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular 
plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular 
agency decision...The test is not meant to be especially 
demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of 
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff, 
[emphasis added] 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court in discussing the "Zone 
of Interest" concept stated that the Congress1 [in Utah it would 
be the Legislature's] "evident intent" was to make agency action 
presumptively reviewable. The class of persons protected is 
broadened and there need be no indication of congressional purpose 
-42-
t~ benefit the would-be p] ai ntiffs — tht \. *umt ;; ; , ,. t ,..- istant 
case. The Engineer in this case argues diametrically opposite to 
i. 11e U i l S C U S S l C i n u i U ± l IM i i : LiiuLi^. ' u i . i l c u L ) l a i . i : b o u. p JL e nitr: V - U U L L ^ a a t : >^ • 
ihc Fngineer argues there must *.. r>/cplicit comment 
b e n e ! - ^ _ : . . * • . . . _ • 
.\ngineer wou J : . "presumpti cv '" ^ -Mke .igoncy 
dc? ; ^vi»* * •! !< L uniy there ib no ^UL;II 
presumpt . . .• • further there must be express language 
>ring the - • J a 3 nt i f f. within tti» perviow of t.hf water laws appeal 
f
 - * a ike 
Engineej - C«JI.illusion. 
Other Federal I'ir- > ^ cni:M ot Anpr-a]^ cases mnstniino Clarke 
Engineej ;T r-, instant -rtA>.<- LSI Computer Systems, Inc. v. United 
States International Trade Commission c-x w '•-* Up-J < P<— j r. 
10' ' ~«»deral Circuit Court .: Appeal. :v- *..: ;;4 t a 
manufacturer: : -.•nponent- p.ut* us^ : products which -.ere 
e x ^ ^ C *•••- • * - • • t o 
appeaJ the exel usi oi :i order , even though it had not been a party to 
the proceedings before the International Trade Commission. 1 h o 
other Uicui Stanley n. [VMU»>II'II were not ;.ar * ies t <j tin. piuc*-edjr r> 
before f r *•- Ut **• c-t.^e rnain^-r t-r.-^v have no standing r r- ^ n»- Both 
v. x. ci JL J\ t_-
 r w
j
 dt L ci i-1 u L c b b j i i<ji , u rtj^jci_n_ yv i i <^  JL i r i g i_j.-. i *' :\ j.« i t i : - • . • . I l a t 
a "i • ' > aqq: ^ -vod" from \ hr decision c>< ,«n administrative acti on 
-4 3-
has the broad appeal protection afforded by the Administrative 
Procedures Act, even though that party was not present in the 
agency proceedings itself. This was also the holding in the Kramer 
v. Virgin Islands case, supra. See discussion in Point 2 of this 
Brief dealing with the Kramer case. 
In LSI, the Federal Circuit Court relied on Clarke to 
interpret the "standing" issue. The Court discussed this matter 
in part as follows: 
The Supreme Court has recognized similar language 
in other statutes providing appellate standing to 'all 
persons adversely affected.' [Citation to Clarke 
omitted]. Moreover in Clarke, the Supreme Court applied 
a 'zone of interest1 test for determining standing to 
appeal from an administrative decision, first set forth 
in Ass'n. of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp. 
397 US 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829 25 L.Ed 2d 184 (1970), 
where the statute involved is without an explicit 
provision specifying who may appeal. Thus, even when a 
statute does not explicitly provide for appeals by non-
party "persons" appellate standing is not necessarily 
limited to parties only. That result reflects the 
Supreme Court's recognition in Data Processing of a 
1
 trend... toward [the] enlargement of a class of people 
who may protest administrative action.f 
Thus it appears clear the Circuit Courts of Appeal are 
interpreting Clarke, Data Processing, Japan Whaling, and other 
cases to be a recognition there is a trend toward enlarging the 
class of people who may protest administrative actions, and even 
when the statute involved does not have explicit provisions 
specifying who may appeal, the rule is that persons should be 
allowed in, even though they were not parties in the administrative 
proceedings "absent some clear and convincing evidence of 
legislative intention to preclude review." 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs submit even under 
-44-
h^r- Engineer'-: "Zone -;f Interest" concept the Engineer must fai 1 
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POINT 4 
THE ENGINEER'S DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CLEARLY OUTI JNED 
IN § 73-3-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, DO APPLY TO 
PERMANENT CHANGE APPLICATIONS COVERED BY § 73-3-3, BECAUSE § 73-3-
3(2) EXPRESSLY MAKES THESE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES APPLICABLE 
TO CHANGE APPLICATIONS, AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR 
EXCLUDING THEM. 
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The last POINT, POINT II, raised by the Engineer in his 
Memorandum [R. 300] deals with the issue of whether the duties and 
responsibilities which the Utah legislature imposed on the State 
Engineer in § 73-3-8 — to conduct adequate investigations and to 
ensure the public welfare would not be endangered — apply to 
Permanent Change Applications or only to "Original" Applications. 
Again, the Engineer has not cited one case in its Memorandum 
dealing with this issue. There is no language from any case cited 
that specifically holds the duties and responsibilities clearly set 
forth in § 73-3-8 do not apply to permanent Change Applications. 
Because of this lack of any authority, the Plaintiffs submit the 
interpretation placed on the statute by the Engineer is the 
Engineer's own personal interpretation, and is in fact contrary to 
the express language adopted by the Utah legislature in § 73-3-3(2) 
which makes the duties and responsibilities in § 73-3-8 applicable 
to Change Application. 
In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege the 
Engineer erred in his Memorandum Decision [copy included in 
Addendum] in that he did not comply with the duties and 
responsibilities which the Utah legislature had imposed upon him 
in § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, because he did 
not adequately investigate the allegations which the Plaintiff's 
witnesses testified to and which the documentary evidence clearly 
supported at the formal hearing in the Engineer's office. These 
witnesses and this evidence demonstrated clearly that approval of 
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Secti on 7 3-3-8 reads in part: as fol lows: 
j£
 t j l e state engineer, because of information in 1 li s 
possession obtained either by his own investigation or 
otherwise, has reason to believe that an application to 
appropriate water . . . will unreasonably effect public 
recreation or will prove detrimental to the public 
welfare, it is his duty to withhold his approval or 
rejection of the application until he has investigated 
the matter. If the application does not meet the 
requirements of this section, it shall be rejected. 
[emphasis added] 
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- 4 7 -
now, after conducting this ten-month on-site inspection, etc., he 
really didn't need to do so and only did it presumably to be a 
"good sport!" In attempting to escape responsibility for his 
negligent investigation, the Engineer now contends any such 
investigation can impose liability on him only where he is 
investigating original water applications under § 73-3-2, but has 
absolutely no bearing on Change Applications, § 73-3-3, even though 
substantial damage to private and public property results from his 
approval of the Change Application! 
So, now, after going through all this on-site investigation 
and other research, at a substantial investment of time and money 
from the state purse, the Engineer now wants this Court to believe 
he really didn't have to make such an investigation, and the duties 
and responsibilities imposed upon him by § 73-3-8, under which he 
made the investigation, really don't apply after all to Change 
Applications. The Plaintiffs submit this is a futile attempt to 
torture the clear language in §§ 73-3-3 and 73-3-8 to reach an 
erroneous result sought by the Engineer to escape liability for his 
negligent investigation. 
Section 73-3-3 by its own terms makes the procedures and 
provisions of § 73-3-8 applicable to a Permanent Change Application 
as opposed to a "Temporary" Change Application. Section 73-3-3(2) 
expressly states in part "...The procedure in the state engineer's 
office and the rights and duties of the applicants with respect to 
applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place, 
or purpose of use shall be the same as provided in this Title for 
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passing applications to appropriate water under §7 3-3-8, but as 
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discussed in Point II, infra, such criteria do not apply to Change 
Applications." [R. 309]. 
Since the State Engineer in footnote 1 on page 9 of its 
Memorandum admits the damages of the Plaintiffs sustained would 
have to be considered under § 73-3-8 in an Original Application, 
and since the Utah legislature in 73-3-3(2) expressly made these 
same duties for an Original Application applicable to a Change 
Application, the Engineer is hard pressed to come up with an 
argument as to why he should not comply with these clear duties and 
responsibilities in § 73-3-8 when considering Change Applications. 
In fact, he does not meet this burden anywhere in his Memorandum. 
It is noteworthy § 73-3-8 states "It shall be the duty of the 
State Engineer to approve an application if:..." [emphasis added]. 
This language does not purport in any way to limit the term "an 
application" only to an Original Application to appropriate water 
under § 73-3-2. It would have been easy to have done so either by 
simply stating "an Original Application" or by saying § 73-3-8 only 
applied to § 73-3-2 Applications. Obviously the legislature did 
not intend such limitation, when it specifically included the 
language in § 73-3-3 making Permanent Change Applications subject 
to the same procedures and imposed upon the applicants the same 
duties as provided in Title 73 for "Applications to Appropriate 
Water." 
Since the applicants — Draper and the Conservancy District -
- had the duty found in § 73-1-8 to "maintain their ditches, 
canals, flumes or other water courses in repair so as to prevent 
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or damage * . ..*e property of others/'1 and since § 
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the Utah Supreme Court to include a multitude of damages such as 
alleged in the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. In Tanner v. 
Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943) the Utah Supreme Court was called 
upon to determine what the legislature meant by the words 
"detrimental to public welfare." The Court reviewed several 
statutes in other jurisdictions and concluded in these words on 
page 964 of the P.2d Reports: 
[17, 18] The State Engineer is also required by the 
statute to reject an application where in his opinion its 
approval 'would prove detrimental to the public 
welfare.' . . . These decisions hold that anything which is 
not for the best interest of the public would be 
'detrimental to the public welfare.'... Under this 
construction the State Engineer was authorized to reject 
or limit the priority of plaintiff's application in the 
interest of the public welfare. [emphasis added]. 
Obviously, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the term 
"detrimental to the public welfare" as broadly as possible by 
holding it means "anything which is not for the best interest of 
the public." Had the Engineer in the instant case complied with 
the duties and responsibilities imposed upon his office by § 73-3-
8 and made the investigation required therein, he would have easily 
determined the following facts which clearly are detrimental to the 
"public welfare" as defined in Tanner, supra. All of these factual 
allegations are set out in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, and they must be regarded as true in a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, where there are not controverting affidavits on 
discovery arguments. 
1. The Plaintiffs and each of them had enjoyed the peaceable 
possession of their properties for more than twenty years prior to 
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the time Defendants submitted their Change Applicati on to t: .he 
offi^- f * ab st atp Engineer• 
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in Draper, Utah as had been done historically. Instead, when the 
screwgate is closed, the water has no place to go but down the 
hillside onto Plaintiffs1 properties* This water fell in 1983 and 
1984 like a Niagara Falls and thoroughly gutted Plaintiffs* 
properties destroying fences, depositing large boulders and other 
debris, cutting roads the Plaintiffs needed for their horse and 
cattle business, splitting a public highway, Dimple Dell Road, and 
eating away large portions of other public property owned by the 
Salt Lake County Recreation Department in an area where a proposed 
public park will be built. This damage has the potential to recur 
each time the screwgate is shut which can happen any time the 
defendants desire to do so. 
6. Prior to the installation of the screwgate and in 
approximately April-May of 1983, the Defendants were engaged in 
constructing a pipeline in the vicinity where the screwgate was 
later located, and in the construction of the said pipeline, the 
Defendants allowed waters in their ditches being conveyed from the 
vicinity of the Bell Canyon Reservoir to the water treatment plant 
in Draper, Utah, to escape from the ditch facilities and to flood 
the Plaintiffs1 properties causing extensive damage to the 
properties. 
7. As a result of the escape of the said water, not only 
were the private properties of the Plaintiffs damaged, but also 
there was substantial damage to public property including Dimple 
Dell Road, Wasatch Boulevard, and public land to the west of Dimple 
Dell Road owned by the Salt Lake County Recreation Department and 
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which was to be used for a park for the public enjoyment of the 
residents of Salt Lake County. 
8. All this damage to the private and public properties 
could have been prevented had the State Engineer conducted the 
investigation required of him in § 73-3-8 and had the State 
Engineer rejected the Change Application, or in the alternative 
approved the Change Application subject to the condition the other 
Defendants would make adequate and reasonable provision for 
conveying waters in their ditches and other water works in a manner 
that would not cause flooding to the Plaintiffs1 properties onto 
public roads, parks and other public property. 
As noted above, the Engineer has not cited one case either 
from Utah or any other state or federal court interpreting the 
precise issue discussed in this Point 4, to-wit, whether the 
Engineer's duties and responsibilities clearly set forth in § 73-
3-8 apply to Permanent Change Applications described in § 73-3-3 
or apply only to original water applications described in § 73-3-
2. Likewise, the Plaintiffs have not been able to find any cases 
from Utah specifically discussing this point, and this is why the 
Plaintiffs say this issue is one of first impression in the state. 
There is, however, a comment in a dissenting opinion by one of the 
noted scholars formerly on this Court which bears on this issue. 
Although a dissenting opinion normally is not the law of the case, 
the context in which Justice Wolfe discusses the application of the 
predecessor of § 73-3-8 and its application to the successor of § 
73-3-3 does have general bearing on this issue. 
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In Movie v. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 882 (Utah 1947), and on 
pages 888-902 of his dissent, Justice Wolfe reviews the development 
of the Utah Water Law. Although the case dealt with conflicting 
claims by prior appropriators and also the rule of beneficial use, 
Justice Wolfe on page 895 made a statement in passing which 
Plaintiffs submit bears directly on the issues in this case. The 
comments do not necessarily even deal with the issues being 
discussed by Judge Wolfe, but the fact he made them, and the fact 
the majority opinion does not disagree with him, is good authority 
for the proposition the Court recognized these fundamental concepts 
did exist in general vogue at that time. Justice Wolfe's comments 
on page 895 of the Pacific 2d Reports on this point are as follows: 
It should be noted that in case of an application 
for a permanent change as compared to a temporary change, 
the procedure shall be the same as is provided for in 
applications to appropriate water. [In other words, the 
permanent change application procedures in § 73-3-3 shall 
be the same in those in § 73-3-2.] Section 100-3-8 
U.C.A. 194 3, [which is the predecessor and virtually 
identical in language to § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended] declares when it shall be the duty of 
the State Engineer to approve an application. The right 
of the applicant is not absolute. The Engineer is 
required to determine certain facts some of which involve 
the element of judgment. In the case of an application 
for a temporary change of use, the Engineer 'Shall make 
an order authorizing the change1 'If such temporary 
change does not impair any vested rights of others.' The 
Shurtleff case was evidently based largely on the 
conception of a vested right either complete or incoate 
as appears from the quoted portion of that case set out 
above. But the word "shall" is used in § 100-3-3 [which 
is the predecessor and virtually identical to § 73-3-3 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended] only in connection 
with an application for a temporary change of place of 
diversion or place or purpose of use. [emphasis added] 
Justice Wolfe noted it was the practice in his day for the 
Engineer to have the same duties and responsibilities with respect 
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to permanent change applications which he did with respect original 
applications to appropriate water in § 73-3-2. 
In conclusion, then, the Plaintiffs submit the duties and 
responsibilities placed upon the Engineer in § 73-3-8 must be 
followed in considering a permanent change application under § 73-
3-3 [as opposed to a temporary change application] to the same 
extent the Engineer must follow these duties and responsibilities 
when considering an original water application under § 73-3-2. In 
the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, they have alleged 
substantial negligence on the part of the Engineer in conducting 
and undertaking the § 73-3-8 investigation, and these allegations 
of negligence raise genuine issues of fact which would preclude the 
granting of the Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs respectfully 
submit the Defendant Utah State Engineer's Motion For Summary 
Judgment should be denied, the Engineer should be reinstated as a 
party defendant in the lawsuit, and the Plaintiffs should be 
allowed to continue with discovery and the trial of this case 
against all defendants including the Engineer. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 1988. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOQ*£fES~>vC. 
AMES A. MCINTOSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 1988, four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS! BRIEF were 
delivered to Michael M. Quealy, Assistant Attorney General, 1636 
West North Temple, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. 
/JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
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BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLICATION ) 
) 
NUMBER 57-3411 (a!3077) ) 
MEMORANDUM DEC 
Change Application Number 57-3411 (al3077) was filed by the 
Draper Irrigation Company and the Salt Lake County Water Conser-
vancy District to change the point of diversion, place and nature 
of use of water rights as evidenced by Decree #3429, 57-3411 
(D47), and 57-443 (A13830), titled in the name of the Draper Ir-
rigation Company; the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
being entitled to the use of portions of said water rights by 
virtue of an agreement entered into with the Draper Irrigation 
Company. 
It was proposed to change one-half of the entire flow of water in 
Bell Canyon (North Dry Creek), all the waters of Middle and South 
Forks Cry Creek, all but 0.18 cfs. of Rocky Mouth and Big Willow 
Creeks, and 1.4 cfs. of water saved as described in water user 
claim 57-443 from the same sources as described above. 
Water has been diverted at poin 
North 17o 10' East 5020 feet, M 
10ff East 2420 feet, South Fork 
feet, Big Willow Creek- South 3 
Mouth Creek- South 39o 15' West 
Corner, Section 23, T3S, R1E, S 
water has been used from Januar 
municipal, storage, industrial, 
from April 1 to September 30 fo 
All water uses were within sect 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 
4, 5, and 6,,T4S, R1E, SLB&M. 
ts as follows: North Dry Creek-
iddle Fork Dry Creek- North 23o 
Dry Creek- North 77o 10• East 2020 
3o 10* West 5055 feet, and Rocky 
3915 feet, all from the NE 
LB&M, and 9,559.5 acre-feet of 
y 1 to December for domestic, 
and stockwatering purposes, and 
r the irrigation of 2716 acres, 
ions 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 
36, T3S, R1E, SLB&M, and sections 
It was proposed to divert 9,559.5 acre-feet of water from the 
same sources with flow rates as heretofore, to be diverted from 
points as follows: North Dry Creek- South 750 feet and East 4121 
feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 14, Middle Fork Dry Creek- \ 
South 2783 feet East 3225 feet from the :Nl/4 Corner, Section 14, 
South Fork Dry Creek- North 306 feet and East 992 feet from the 
Sl/4 Corner, Section 14, Big Willow Creek- South 2609 feet and 
West 853 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 23, and Rocky Mouth 
Creek- South 2389 feet and West 493 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, 
Section 23, all T3S, R1E, SLB&M. 
The portion of the water to be used by the Draper Irrigation Com-
pany would be for the period from January 1, to December 31, and 
would include domestic, stockwatering, commercial, fire protec-
tion, and other purposes incidental to the requirements of Draper 
City, which would be provided both raw water from the mountain 
streams herein described, and treated water from the Draper 
Treatment Plant, which is operated by the Company. The Company 
would also irrigate 1790.7 acres from April 1 to September 30. 
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The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District proposed to use 
water following treatment at it's Southeast Regional Water Treat-
ment Plant, from January 1, to December 31 for municipal purposes 
within the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Districts bound-
aries. The change application was advertised in the Deseret News 
from June 28, 1984 through July 12, 1984, and was protested by 
Stanley B. Donhanw 
A hearing was held in Salt Lake City on February 26, 1985 and was 
attended by the applicants representatives, and the protestant 
with liis representatives. At the hearing the applicants stated 
that Draper Irrigation Company had a contract with Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District which allowed the District to 
utilize portions of the Company's water for municipal purposes, 
following treatment at the Districts treatment plant, and that 
the subject change application had been precipitated by this con-
tractual agreement. 
The protestant stated that as a result of the project construc-
tion, his property was flooded in 1983 and 1984 causing extensive 
property damage, and that the now-completed project was con-
structed such that further flooding of this property could occur 
in the future due to project maintenance, or for other causes at 
the option of the District. He further stated that the District 
had not obtained permits allowing them to discharge water from 
their system, and that the project as constructed was detrimental 
to the public welfare. 
In an effort.to gain additional information relative to this mat-
ter, the State Engineer's Staff conducted a field review on May 
7, 1985. Representatives of both the applicant and protestant 
were present for the review, which included observations of al-
leged damage to the protestant's property, along with observa-
tions of the District's construction which took place in connec-
tion with temporary water rights change applications approved by 
the State Engineer. 
In a review of the foregoing, the State Engineer concludes that: 
1. He is without authority relative to damages which may have 
been sustained in connection with project construction 
which occurred as a result of his reaction to water right 
applications; therefore, this issue does not apply to 
this change application. 
2. The State Engineer is not in receipt of evidence indicat-
ing that existing water rights will be impaired if this 
change application is implemented. 
In consideration of these conclusions, it is the opinion of the 
State Engineer that this application can be approved. 
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This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for plenary review by 
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court 
within sixty days from the date hereof. 
Dated this 26th day of December 1985. 
frg-*^ 
Robert L. Morgan, p<E., State Engineer 
RLM:EDF:laz 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 26th day 
of December, 1985 to: 
Draper Irrigation Co. 
2582 South 950 East 
Draper, UT 84020 
Salt Lake Water Cons. Dist. 
P.O. Box 15618 
3495 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 85115 
Stanley B. Bonham 
10741 Dimple Del Road 
Sandy, UT 84092 
4 
James A. Mcintosh 
James A. Mcintosh and Assoc. 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. So. 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
i 
D. Brent Rose 
% Clyde & Pratt 
2 00 American Savings Plaza 
7 7 West Second South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Lee Kapaloski _ 
% Kapaloski, Kinghorn & Pe ters E X H I B I T * 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
BY: LM2ZL 
. aure l A. Zundel , S e c r e t a r y 
ARTICLE I, SECTION II, UTAH CONSTITUTION 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
EXHIBIT 2 
SECTION 73-3-3 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED 
Change of place of diversion or use — Right to — Permanent 
or temporary — Application — Contents — Investigation — Notice 
and hearing — Deposit to cover expenses — No effect on priority 
of original application — Violation as misdemeanor — Exception 
as to replacement wells — Division of Wildlife Resources may file 
applications — Purposes — Conditions — Finality of state 
engineer's determination. 
(1) Any person entitled to the use of water may change the 
place of diversion or use and may use the water for other purposes 
than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no such 
change may be made if it impairs any vested right without just 
compensation. These changes may be permanent or temporary. 
Changes for an indefinite length of time with an intention to 
relinquish the original point of diversion, place, or purpose of 
use are defined as permanent changes. Temporary changes include 
and are limited to all changes for definitely fixed periods of not 
exceeding one year. Both permanent and temporary changes of point 
of diversion, place, or purpose of use of water including water 
involved in general adjudication or other suits, shall be made in 
the manner provided in this section. 
(2) No change may be made unless the change application is 
approved by the state engineer. Applications shall be made upon 
forms furnished by the state engineer and shall set forth: the name 
of the applicant; a description of the water right; the quantity 
of water; the stream or source; the point on the stream or source 
where the water is diverted; the point to which it is proposed to 
change the diversion of the water; the place, purpose, and extent 
of the proposed use; and any other information that the state 
engineer may require. The procedure in the state engineerfs office 
and the rights and duties of the applicants with respect to 
applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place, 
or purpose of use shall be the same as provided in this title for 
applications to appropriate water; but the state engineer may, in 
connection with applications for permanent change involving only 
a change in point of diversion of 660 feet or less, waive the 
necessity for publishing a notice of application. The state 
engineer shall investigate all temporary change applications and 
if he finds that the temporary change will not impair any vested 
rights of others, he shall make an order authorizing the change. 
If he finds that the change sought might impair vested rights, he 
shall give notice of the application to all persons whose rights 
might be affected by the change and shall give them an opportunity 
to be heard before authorizing the change. The notice may be given 
by regular mail at least five days before the hearing or by one 
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in 
which the original point of diversion or place of use is located 
five days before the hearing. Before making an investigation or 
giving notice, the state engineer may require the applicant to 
deposit a sum of money sufficient to pay the expenses of the 
investigation and publication of notice. 
EXHIBIT 3 
(3) Applications for either permanent or temporary changes 
may not be rejected for the sole reason that the change would 
impair the vested rights of others, but if otherwise proper, they 
may be approved as to part of the water involved or upon the 
condition that conflicting rights are acquired* 
(4) Any person holding an approved application for the 
appropriation of water may either permanently or temporarily change 
the point of diversion, place, or purpose of use, but no such 
change of an approved application may affect the priority of the 
original application; except that no change of point of diversion, 
place, or nature of use set forth in an approved application 
operates to enlarge the time within which the construction of work 
shall begin or be completed. 
(5) Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point 
of diversion, place, or purpose of use, either permanently or 
temporarily, without first applying to the state engineer in the 
manner provided in this section, obtains no right and is guilty of 
a misdemeanor, each day of such unlawful change constituting a 
separate offense, separately punishable. 
(6) The provisions of this section do not apply to the 
replacement of an existing well by a new well drilled within a 
radius of 150 feet from the point of diversion from the existing 
well, and no such replacement well shall be drilled except upon 
compliance with the requirements of Section 73-3-28. 
(7)(a) The Division of Wildlife Resources may file 
applications for permanent or temporary changes, in accordance with 
the requirements of this section: (i) on perfected water rights 
presently owned by the Division of Wildlife Resources; or (ii) on 
perfected water rights purchased by that division through funding 
provided for that purpose by legislative appropriation, or acquired 
by lease, agreement, gift, exchange, contribution; or (iii) on 
appurtenant water rights acquired with the acquisition of real 
property for other wildlife purposes. 
(b) Changes allowed in Subsection (7)(a) shall only be for 
the limited purpose of providing water for instream flows in 
natural channels necessary for the preservation or propagation of 
fish within a designated section of a natural stream channel. This 
subsection does not allow enlargement of the water right sought to 
be changed nor may the change impair any vested water right. 
(c) An application filed by the Division of Wildlife 
Resources shall, in addition to the other requirements of this 
section, set forth the points on the natural stream between which 
the necessary instream flows will be provided by the change and 
shall be accompanied by appropriate studies, reports, or other 
information required by the state engineer demonstrating the 
necessity for such instream flows in the specified section of the 
natural stream, and the projected benefits to the public fishery 
which will result from the change. 
EXHIBIT 8 
(d) The Division of Wildlife Resources may not acquire 
title or a long-term interest in a water right for the purposes 
provided in Subsection (7)(b) without prior legislative approval. 
After obtaining this approval, the Division of Wildlife Resources 
may file a request for a permanent change as provided in Subsection 
(7) (a). 
(e) This Subsection (7) does not authorize the Division 
of Wildlife Resources to (i) appropriate unappropriated water under 
Section 73-3-2 for the purpose of providing instream flows, or (ii) 
acquire water rights by eminent domain for instream flows or for 
any other purpose. 
(f) This Subsection (7) shall only apply to applications 
filed on or after April 28, 1986. 
(8) The determination of the state engineer is final, unless 
an action to review his decision is filed within the time and in 
the manner provided Section 73-3-14. 
EXHIBIT 8 
SECTION 73-3-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED 
Approval or rejection of application — Requirements for 
approval — Application for specified period of time — Filing of 
royalty contract for removal of salt or minerals. 
(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve an 
application if: (a) there is unappropriated water in the proposed 
source; (b) the proposed use will not impair existing rights or 
interfere with the more beneficial use of the water; (c) the 
proposed plan is physically and economically feasible, unless the 
application is filed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 
and would not prove detrimental to the public welfare; (d) the 
applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works; 
and (e) the application was filed in good faith and not for 
purposes of speculation or monopoly. If the state engineer, 
because of information in his possession obtained either by his own 
investigation or otherwise, has reason to believe that an 
application to appropriate water will interfere with its more 
beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock 
watering, power or mining development or manufacturing, or will 
unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural stream 
environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it 
is his duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the 
application until he has investigated the matter. If an 
application does not meet the requirements of this section, it 
shall be rejected. 
(2) An application to appropriate water for industrial, 
power, mining development, manufacturing purposes, agriculture, or 
municipal purposes may be approved for a specific and certain 
period from the time the water is placed to beneficial use under 
the application, but in no event may an application be granted for 
a period of time less than that ordinarily needed to satisfy the 
essential and primary purpose of the application or until the water 
is no longer available as determined by the state engineer. At the 
expiration of the period fixed by the state engineer the water 
shall revert to the public and is subject to appropriation as 
provided by Title 73. The state engineer may extend any limited 
water right upon a showing that the essential purpose of the 
original application has not been satisfied, that the need for an 
extension is not the result of any default or neglect by the 
applicant, and that water is still available; except no extension 
shall exceed the time necessary to satisfy the primary purpose of 
the original application. A request for extension must be filed 
in writing in the office of the state engineer not later than 60 
days before the expiration date of the application. 
(3) Before the approval of any application for the 
appropriations of water from navigable lakes or streams of the 
state which contemplates the recovery of salts and other minerals 
therefrom by precipitation or otherwise, the applicant shall file 
with the state engineer a copy of a contract for the payment of 
royalties to the state of Utah. The approval of an application 
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shall be revoked in the event of the failure of the applicant to 
comply with terms of his royalty contract. 
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SECTION 73-3-14 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED 
Review by courts of engineer's decisions. 
In any case where a decision of the state engineer is involved 
any person aggrieved by the decision may within 60 days after 
notice bring a civil action in the district court for a plenary 
review. The state engineer shall give notice of his decision by 
mailing a copy by regular mail to the applicant and to each 
protestant. Notice is considered to have been given on the date 
of mailing. The place of trial, subject to the power of the court 
to change it as provided by law, shall be in the county in which 
the stream or water source, or some part of it, is located. The 
state engineer shall be joined as a defendant in all suits to 
review his decisions, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the 
litigation may be rendered against him. Parties shall be served 
with process as in other cases and notice of the pendency of the 
action shall be filed by the clerk of the district court with the 
state engineer within 20 days after it is commenced, which operates 
to stay all further proceedings pending the decision of the 
district court. Review of the decision of the district court shall 
be by the Supreme Court. 
Venue for judicial review — State engineer as defendant. 
(1)(a) Any person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer 
may obtain judicial review by following the procedures and 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings shall be in the county in which the stream or water 
source, or some part of it, is located. 
(2) The state engineer shall be joined as defendant in all 
suits to review his decisions, but no judgment for costs or 
expenses of the litigation may be rendered against him. 
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116 
Telephone: (801) 533-4446 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M. 
BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERRAYS and 
ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS, 
Plaintiffs, 
ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State 
Engineer; SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah 
and a body corporate; and DRAPER 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AMD ORDER 
EXPRESSLY DIRECTING 
ENTRY OF JUDGMKRT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b) 
Civil No. C-86-1341 
(Judge Raymond S. Uno) 
Defendant Utah State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on Count I of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint came before 
the Court for hearing on November 20, 1987. Further conferences 
were held betweei. the Court and counsel by telephone on November 
30, 1987 and December 7, 1987. Plaintiffs are represented by 
James A. Mcintosh. Defendant Utah State Engineer is represented 
by Dallm W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy. Defendants Draper 
CVUIDIT 
Irrigation Company and Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Dis-
trict are represented by Lee E. Kapaloskl and ~.>Roy S. Axland, 
respectively. 
The Court having reviewed the filer including the affidavits 
and memoranda of counsel submitted on the present mot:on; having 
heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and the Court 
being fully advised in this matter concludes that the change ap-
plication process under Section 73-3-3 U.C.A. is narrow in scope; 
that the issues raised by Plaintiffs are outside the limited 
criteria governing the approval and rejection of change applica-
tions; and that Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved persons" within the 
meaning of Section 73-3-14 U.C.A.. The Court therefore grants 
the Motion of Defendant Utah State Engineer for Summary Judgment. 
Further, the Court has indicated orally in explaining its ruling 
to counsel that while Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring an 
action to review the Decision of the State Entinker, their pro-
test and participation before the State Engineer har placed De-
fendants Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper 
Irrigation Company on notice of Plaintiffs' concerns, so as to 
preserve Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages as pleaded else-
where in the Second Amended Complaint. 
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that 
Defendant State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and is 
hereby granted, and that judgment is hereby entered against 
Plaintiffs, dismissing with prejudice Count I of Plaintiffs* 
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Second Amended Complaint, which is the only Count therein 
directed at the State Engineer- This jvdgrsent does not affect 
the allegations against the other Defendants as set fortn in 
Plaintiffs1 Second amended Complaint. 
The Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that t-his judgment 
be entered as a final judgment within the meaning of Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Each party shall bear its own costs. 
DATED this /T day of Fihmwnry, 1988. 
BY THE COURT* 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forego-
ing proposed JUDGMENT AND ORDER EXPRESSLY DIRECTING ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULB 54(b), was served by mailing the same, 
first class postage prepaid, this 4th day of February, 1988, to: 
James A* Mcintosh 
Attorney at Law 
Intrade Building South #14 
1399 South 700 Bast 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
LeRoy S. Axland 
Attorney at Law 
175 South West Temple 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Lee E. Kapaloski 
Attorney at Law 
185 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11898 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8414? 
MICHAEL H. Q 
Assistant Att< 
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